Empathy in Mental Illness

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The lack of ability to emphathize is central to many psychiatric conditions. Empathy is affected by neurodevelopment, brain pathology and psychiatric illness. Empathy is both a state and a trait characteristic. Empathy is measurable by neuropsychological assessment and neuroimaging techniques. This book, first published in 2007, specifically focuses on the role of empathy in mental illness. It starts with the clinical psychiatric perspective and covers empathy in the context of mental illness, adult health, developmental course, and explanatory models. Psychiatrists, psychotherapists and mental heath professionals will find this a very useful reference for their work.

Empathy in Mental Illness Review

Strengths: This is a vast resource of some two dozen articles on the consequence for a person's physical and mental well-being (health) when empathy is missing. This can best be described as a resource for an advanced seminar in psychiatry in medical school. It validates a market for and interest in empathy as a part of the well-being of every person.
Weaknesses: Those parts of it that are psychologically the most relevant are philosophically na�ve, with such great thinkers such as E. Husserl, G. H. Mead, and T. Lipps - the latter not necessarily a great thinker, but certainly responsible for popularizing "empathy" - being cited by way of an "argument from authority." For example, V. Gallese's "shared manifold hypothesis" for empathy is essentially that of I. Kant (possibly by way of E. Husserl) and deserves a thorough critique. A `shared manifold" is basically a sensory configuration such as a vicarious experience in which two individuals participate. It is an explanatory construct, not immediately available in introspection. It is promising, engaging and logically incoherent. The more the shared manifold is shared, the less transparent it becomes. From the perspective of the phenomenal experience of empathy (not to be confused with the phenomenological method of Husserl), Gallese proceeds to identify the shared manifold with an enlarged sense of empathy (Gallese 2001: 45). This is definitely not one of the consequences of neurology for empathy. If anything, it is a bold standalone proposal - to enlarge the application of empathy to provide a foundation for intersubjectivity at large. This position was anticipated by Agosta (though he is perhaps not the only one) in his article "Empathy and Intersubjectivity" (1984). See also - www.EmpathyInTheContextOfPhilosophy.com. For example, in another article M. Iacoboni commits a non sequitur of numbing grossness. After elaborating a complex functional mechanism of significant power and perspicuity, he concludes that empathy does not rely on inference but is the immediate givenness of the other in his affect, emotion, or feeling. The non sequitur is that the latter is at the level of our phenomenal experience--I do not experience an inference; but "under the hood," significant simulations are being computed by the neurological infrastructure. Still, in its own way, this is a substantial collection belonging in the library of anyone interested in empathy. Hey, at least have the school library put in an order. In spite of caveats and issues - many due to the controversial nature of empathy itself - your time spent on this volume will be well spent and rewarded.

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